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INGLÊS - RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

LEIA ATENTAMENTE AS INSTRUÇÕES ABAIXO.

- 01 - Você recebeu do fiscal o seguinte material:
- este Caderno, com o enunciado das 20 questões objetivas de **INGLÊS - RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS**, sem repetição ou falha;
 - um **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA**, com seu nome e número de inscrição, destinado às respostas das questões objetivas formuladas na prova de **INGLÊS - RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS**.
- 02 - Verifique se este material está em ordem e se o seu nome e número de inscrição conferem com os que aparecem no **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA**. Caso contrário, notifique **IMEDIATAMENTE** ao fiscal.
- 03 - Após a conferência, o candidato deverá assinar, no espaço próprio do **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA**, a caneta esferográfica transparente de tinta na cor preta.
- 04 - No **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA**, a marcação das letras correspondentes às respostas certas deve ser feita cobrindo a letra e preenchendo todo o espaço compreendido pelos círculos, a **lápiz preto nº 2** ou **caneta esferográfica transparente de tinta na cor preta**, de forma contínua e densa. A leitura ótica do **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA** é sensível a marcas escuras, portanto, preencha os campos de marcação completamente, sem deixar claros.
- Exemplo: (A) ● (C) (D) (E)
- 05 - Tenha muito cuidado com o **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA**, para não o **DOBRAR, AMASSAR** ou **MANCHAR**. O **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA** somente poderá ser substituído se, no ato da entrega ao candidato, já estiver danificado em suas margens superior e/ou inferior - **DELIMITADOR DE RECONHECIMENTO PARA LEITURA ÓTICA**.
- 06 - Para cada uma das questões objetivas são apresentadas 5 alternativas classificadas com as letras (A), (B), (C), (D) e (E); só uma responde adequadamente ao quesito proposto. Você só deve assinalar **UMA RESPOSTA**: a marcação em mais de uma alternativa anula a questão, **MESMO QUE UMA DAS RESPOSTAS ESTEJA CORRETA**.
- 07 - As questões são identificadas pelo número que se situa acima de seu enunciado.
- 08 - **SERÁ ELIMINADO** do Concurso Vestibular o candidato que:
- se utilizar, durante a realização da prova, de máquinas e/ou relógios de calcular, bem como de rádios gravadores, *headphones*, telefones celulares ou fontes de consulta de qualquer espécie;
 - se ausentar da sala em que se realiza a prova levando consigo este Caderno de Questões e/ou o **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA**;
 - não assinar a Lista de Presença e/ou o **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA**.
- Obs.** O candidato só poderá se ausentar do recinto da prova após **30 (trinta) minutos** contados a partir do efetivo início da mesma.
- 09 - Reserve os 30 (trinta) minutos finais para marcar seu **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA**.
- 10 - Quando terminar, entregue ao fiscal o **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA** e este **CADERNO DE QUESTÕES** e **ASSINE** a **LISTA DE PRESENÇA**.
- 11 - **O TEMPO DISPONÍVEL PARA ESTA PROVA DE QUESTÕES OBJETIVAS É DE 2 (DUAS) HORAS.**

BOA PROVA!

INGLÊS - RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

Brazil as a bridge between old and new powers?

One of the lines routinely taken by Brazilian officials engaged in international affairs is that their country is uniquely positioned to bridge chasms and build consensus in international affairs. Prosaic reasons for this abound. Culturally the country is diverse, claiming to have more people of Japanese descent than any country other than Japan, and more citizens of African ancestry than any country but Nigeria. Socio-economic realities in Brazil also capture the economic chasm of the North–South divide: the country exports advanced passenger aircraft and high fashion design while simultaneously grappling with tens of millions struggling to survive in poverty. Historical tradition and the exigencies of political and legal processes psychologically predispose Brazil to discussion and conciliation in search of an avenue to any particular desired outcome. This translates on a formal level into a highly juridical culture with strong contending regional and political factions that have to spend enormous amounts of time negotiating lest paralysis take hold. Brazilian diplomats have this in mind when they quip that they arrive at international discussions with the consensus position already outlined because the competing interests found in global talks have been reconciled during the formulation of their own national position.

Such a benign, conciliatory, consensus-creating persona for Brazilian diplomacy is only amplified by the country's economic and military insertion into South America and the global system. Brazil lacks a history of conquest or imperial domination. The country manifestly does not present a security threat to its neighbours, possessing little more armed might than the scant minimum necessary to vouchsafe its own basic territorial integrity. It would thus seem that Brazil is ideally positioned to be the prototypical bridge-builder, working diligently to ensure stability and predictability in the face of rising tensions between major powers as well as the North and the global South. This article contends that while such an understanding has some merit, a simple view of Brazil as honest broker in global affairs overlooks the self-interested streak that lies at the core of Brazilian foreign policy and drives its attitudes to the development of international regimes and the conduct of global governance. In the theoretical terms set out in the introduction to this special issue of *International Affairs*, Brazil casts itself as something of an integrative, value-creating negotiator in the international arena. But when examined on a deeper level, the country bears more resemblance to a distributive, value-claiming actor. The ability of Brazilian diplomats to carry off this double identity rests in the country's carefully constructed position as the intermediate or bridging ground between the South and the North. In

this context the role of bridge-builder offers Brazil three advantages that have only coincidental alignment with what existing powers would label good international citizenship: (a) controlling the flow of political and ideational interaction back and forth between the North and South; (b) exacting a 'toll' for traffic in each direction; (c) being indispensable to the international system because it is seen as the link between old and emerging powers.

To be completely clear, Brazil is simply doing too well economically and is too secure politically within the existing system to want any real change to the structure of the international system. The challenge that confronts Brazilian foreign policy architects is thus how to improve their country's relative position within the international arena without engaging in behaviour that will fundamentally damage the system. Its key instrument in meeting this challenge is reframing debates and influencing others with ideas and allusions to future prospects, not hard power resources. While at times this means that there might appear to be a language of rebellion and substantive revision in Brazil's foreign policy statements, even ostensibly isolationist ideas such as Lula's new international economic geography are fundamentally predicated on maintenance of the existing global governance structures. The Brazilian aim is not to overturn these decision-making tables, but rather to gain an important seat with decision-influencing power that will allow the advancement of its own interests while retarding initiatives it sees as inimical. In part, this fits with Brazil's long-standing ambition to be viewed and accepted as a major world power, captured in its perennial ambitions for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and the fervent belief within Itamaraty that Brazil is the country of the future. On a more operational level, it fits with Brazil's actual power projection capabilities, which are distinctly limited in economic, military and political terms. Maintenance of the existing international system is thus critical because Brazil has found a very cost-effective way of vouchsafing its sovereignty and autonomy through the strategic use and interpretation of international institutions, norms and regimes.

For the last 20 years Itamaraty has been working to position Brazil as a leader of first South America and then the global South. The sort of institutional machinations seen in the inter-American system and the UN form an important part of the foreign policy strategy of making Brazil the conduit for regional coordination and wider pan-southern interaction. Brazil's approach is essentially one of coalition formation, aimed at compensating for its deficiencies in respect of hard power military and economic credentials with its ample ability to generate ideas that are operationalized through diplomatic flair and a capacity to mobilize or derail initiatives requiring a larger southern voice. On the applied front, this earns Brazil an invitation to major international

115 decision-making tables such as the G20 and the UN.
This in turn becomes important to the wider foreign
policy priority of maintaining the pre-eminence of
the international norm of sovereignty as a device for
protecting national autonomy. What is different about
120 the Brazilian sequencing is that its diplomats avoid
tactics of simple opposition and blatant deadlocking,
preferring instead to find technical routes that may
deliver the same end by reworking accepted world-
views or established causal patterns to create a new
125 frame of reference for international negotiations and
the participating actors.

Within this context, the project of constructing a
role for Brazil as bridge between the North and the
South is critical. It offers a way of positioning Brazil
130 as an interlocutor that allows it effectively to exact
a 'toll' on the bridge. Brazil's consequent response
to international negotiations is to advance its own
interests behind a pan-southern value-creating,
integrative fascia.

135 The remaining question is the extent to which
these subtle turns and speed bumps will result in
real changes in global governance frameworks and
the international distribution of meaningful power and
influence. Brazil's preference is that they cause little
140 alteration in the core rules and regimes, but perhaps
a slight shift in norms that puts Brazil in a central
position.

Although over-used, Brazilian musician
Tom Jobim's line that 'Brazil is not for beginners'
145 aptly applies to understanding how it addresses
international issues, presenting a significant challenge
for policy-makers in northern capitals used to a system
focused on northern Atlantic issues. Assumptions
about how Brazil will react to invitations to participate
150 or approaches to consult on policy issues need to
be rethought. The considerable diplomatic capacity
found in Itamaraty is matched by an impressive ability
to develop and communicate new ideas through
a process of patient discussion and civil debate to
155 create a consensus around something remarkably
close to Brazil's view. This approach to international
issues differs markedly from that found in traditional
powers in the North, which have a reputation for
often using a blunt stick and a very small carrot to
160 gain consent. The interesting point is that this may
present more of an opportunity than a threat for the
policy agendas of the traditional powers. Brazil's core
interests and ambitions align remarkably well with
those of other major powers; and, moreover, pursuit
165 of these interests has been undertaken in a manner
that has yet to raise hackles throughout the South.
This makes Brazil a potentially valuable partner for the
continued management of regional and global issues,
but only if northern capitals are able to shift how they
170 view Brazil and learn a new variation on their existing
themes of global governance.

Sean W. Burges
International Affairs 89: 3 (2013) 577-594. Adapted

1

The communicative intention of this article is to

- (A) inform that Brazil deserves more international credit as an honest broker in global affairs.
- (B) explain how Brazil positions itself in the role of a bridge-builder in the global system.
- (C) defeat the argument that Brazilian diplomacy is always conciliatory in nature for fear of imperialistic attacks.
- (D) reveal that Brazil does not pose a security threat to its neighbors due to the scanty status of its armed forces.
- (E) question Brazil's role as an effective political and economic leader among the Southern Hemisphere nations.

2

The author uses the expression "Prosaic reasons for this abound" (lines 4-5) to

- (A) convince readers that the international affairs officers in Brazil are wrong.
- (B) criticize the atypical attitudes of Brazilian officials in defending their country.
- (C) support that the Brazilian foreign affairs position is irrelevant and unsustainable.
- (D) introduce concrete arguments to support the idea expressed in the first sentence of the text.
- (E) reveal that Brazilian government leaders do not have enough arguments to sustain their position of international consensus.

3

According to the Brazilian foreign affairs officials, all of the following are supportive arguments for seeing Brazil as a country that can play an important role in international affairs, **EXCEPT**

- (A) a tradition of finding consensus to reach desired goals supported by political and legal processes.
- (B) a long-established practice of extended discussions among different political views to reach conciliatory negotiation.
- (C) the skill in dealing with extremes, such as an advanced technological production on the one hand, and a high percentile of population in poverty on the other.
- (D) the ethnic diversity present in Brazil: a huge population of Japanese descent and an enormous number of inhabitants of African ancestry.
- (E) the Brazilian diplomats' position to impose their own national point of view on the competing interests of the other international members.

4

The fragment "...lest paralysis take hold." (lines 20-21) can be rephrased without change in meaning by

- (A) in order to prevent negotiations from occurring.
- (B) so that paralysis holds the competing parties together.
- (C) provided that negotiations are interrupted by paralysis.
- (D) for fear that the contending factions become paralyzed.
- (E) in case the countries' negotiation skills help overcome paralysis.

5

The author claims that “Brazil lacks a history of conquest or imperial domination.” (lines 30-31) to support the idea that

- (A) the country is not a threat to the security of other South American countries and thus cannot hold a conciliatory position among nations.
- (B) the armed forces of the country are only enough to ensure national security and not ready for armed invasions or struggles in other territories.
- (C) the country’s absence of abundant military forces adds to its strength as a bridge-builder which can guarantee stability in facing tensions between nations.
- (D) there are growing tensions between the North and the South American countries that Brazil cannot deal with.
- (E) the stability and predictability of Brazil’s foreign policy will not assist its goal of conquering the neighboring countries.

6

Based on the meanings of the words in Paragraph 2, it can be said that

- (A) amplified (line 28) and *weakened* are synonymous.
- (B) vouchsafe (line 34) and *withhold* have identical meanings.
- (C) ensure (line 37) and *guarantee* have opposite meanings.
- (D) contends (line 40) and *argues* express similar ideas.
- (E) casts (line 48) and *projects* are antonymous.

7

In the fragments “the country exports advanced passenger aircraft and high fashion design while simultaneously **grappling with** tens of millions struggling to survive in poverty” (lines 10-13) and “The ability of Brazilian diplomats to **carry off** this double identity rests in the country’s carefully constructed position as the intermediate or bridging ground between the South and the North.” (lines 52-55), ‘grappling with’ and ‘carry off’ mean, respectively:

- (A) dealing with – assume
- (B) suppressing – get through
- (C) drawing away – achieve
- (D) withstanding – give up
- (E) coping with – neglect

8

The argumentation presented in the fragment “The sort of institutional machinations seen in the inter-American system and the UN form an important part of the foreign policy strategy of making Brazil the conduit for regional coordination and wider pan-southern interaction.” (lines 102-106) reveals

- (A) a hypothesis to be refuted.
- (B) an attitude to achieve a specific result.
- (C) an emphatic support of an illegal tactic.
- (D) a comparison between different methods.
- (E) the solution to an insurmountable problem.

9

In the fragment “But when examined on a deeper level, the country bears more resemblance to a distributive, value-claiming actor.” (lines 50-52) the expression ‘to bear resemblance to’ means

- (A) to contrast with.
- (B) to be similar to.
- (C) to be different from.
- (D) to be incompatible with.
- (E) to show unlikeness with.

10

The word in bold is substituted by the word in parentheses, without change in meaning, in

- (A) “...**because** the competing interests found in global talks have been reconciled during the formulation of their own national position.” – lines 24-26 (*meanwhile*)
- (B) “It would **thus** seem that Brazil is ideally positioned to be the prototypical bridge-builder,” – lines 35-37 (*furthermore*)
- (C) “...working diligently to ensure stability and predictability in the face of rising tensions between major powers **as well as** the North and the global South.” – lines 37-40 (*at the expense of*)
- (D) “but rather to gain an important seat with decision-influencing power that will allow the advancement of its own interests **while** retarding initiatives it sees as inimical.” – lines 83-86 (*whenever*)
- (E) “Brazil’s core interests and ambitions align remarkably well with those of other major powers; and, **moreover**, pursuit of these interests has been undertaken...” – lines 162-165 (*besides*)

11

In terms of pronominal reference,

- (A) ‘This’ in “This translates on a formal level into a highly juridical culture with strong contending regional and political factions...” (lines 17-19) refers to “avenue” (line 16)
- (B) ‘They’ in “Brazil’s preference is that they cause little alteration in the core rules and regimes” (lines 139-140) refers to “power and influence” (lines 138-139)
- (C) ‘Which’ in “which have a reputation for often using a blunt stick and a very small carrot to gain consent.” (lines 158-160) refers to “issues” (line 157)
- (D) ‘Those’ in “...align remarkably well with those of other major powers” (lines 163-164) refers to “interests and ambitions” (line 163)
- (E) ‘Their’ in “learn a new variation on their existing themes of global governance.” (lines 170-171) refers to “issues” (line 168)

12

In “...invitations to participate or approaches to consult on policy issues **need to be** rethought.” (lines 149-151), the writer expresses a(an)

- (A) logical necessity.
- (B) improbable guess.
- (C) slight probability.
- (D) concrete possibility.
- (E) unquestionable truth.

13

In the fragment "For the last 20 years Itamaraty has been working to position Brazil as a leader of first South America and then the global South." (lines 100-102), 'has been working' expresses

- (A) a finished action in the past.
- (B) an action that finished very recently.
- (C) an action in progress at a moment in the past.
- (D) a past action which has a result in the present.
- (E) an action which started in the past and continues in the present.

14

An appropriate explanation of the expression taken from the text is found in

- (A) "value-creating negotiator" (line 49) refers to Brazil as a mediator that values international creations.
- (B) "decision-making tables" (line 83) refers to decisions that are made under the table.
- (C) "decision-influencing power" (lines 84-85) conveys the idea of an authority that dominates the nations that decide.
- (D) "long-standing ambition" (line 87) conveys the idea of an ambition that is enduring.
- (E) "wider pan-southern interaction" (line 106) conveys the idea of pan-southern countries that are unwilling to relate to each other.

15

The fragment "Brazilian musician Tom Jobim's line that 'Brazil is not for beginners'" (lines 143-144) is used by the author to

- (A) contest Tom Jobim's statement with the counter-arguments that Brazilian foreign policy is totally transparent.
- (B) justify that Itamaraty is eager to communicate new ideas of which the dissemination of Brazilian culture and music is essential.
- (C) reinforce the idea that Brazil is not always easy to understand since the essence of its foreign policy issues lies beyond superficial impressions.
- (D) make an appealing literary reference for international readers to understand how Brazilian musicians in general view their own society.
- (E) reveal that Brazilian policy makers strictly endorse northern Atlantic viewpoints in addressing international affairs that are discussed in the Itamaraty rounds.

16

In "The interesting point is that this may present more of an opportunity than a threat..." (lines 160-161), 'may present' is replaced without change in meaning by

- (A) can present.
- (B) will present.
- (C) should present.
- (D) has to present.
- (E) needs to present.

17

In the last section of the article, lines 151-171, the author states that

- (A) Brazil's diplomatic attitude is a huge menace to the international policies adopted by the powerful nations of the globe.
- (B) Brazil's perspective on international issues at present is quite aligned with that undertaken by all of the traditional powerful nations of the northern hemisphere.
- (C) the Brazilian foreign affairs ministry is very good at negotiating and leading different nations into a consensual position, as long as this perspective is aligned with its own.
- (D) nations in the North which have held powerful positions internationally have employed very impressive and efficient approaches to reach global consensus on relevant issues.
- (E) Brazil will only be a beneficial player in international issues if nations from the North maintain their own stand in issues that involve economic and financial negotiations.



18

The text 'Brazil as a bridge between old and new powers?' has been extracted from a text published in the periodical *International Affairs*, issue nº 89. The issue, as stated by the editors in an introductory article, '... has been divided into two parts. Part one comprises case-studies of three rising powers — Brazil, India and China — while the articles in part two cover the various actors and entities that have reason and/or ability to attempt to manage the rise of new powers. (...) These multiple actors may be grouped into four categories...'

The following definitions were given in the introductory article for each of the categories:

1. This group comprises states and groupings of states that have acquired, over the past decades, the role of agenda-setters as Great Powers. They have exerted defining influence in shaping the rules and norms of global governance. Despite their relative decline (especially with reference to the rising powers), they still have enough power to act as gatekeepers to the inner sanctums of international regimes.
2. In this category are the countries that represent the proverbial grass that gets trampled when elephants fight. They often form the unfortunate terrain on which scrambles for power can occur, but are also occasionally able to exercise powerful leverage by providing the follower base that aspiring leaders seek, and legitimize claims to greater power by securing for those leaders the backing of large numbers.
3. As the shift in the balance of power that we see under way today is not occurring simply between states, this category includes businesses and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have emerged as repositories and brokers of power, effectively harnessed by states at different levels of the hierarchy and harnessing them to serve their own causes in turn.
4. This category recognizes that most international organizations, regimes and networks are seldom 'actors' in their own right. But different organizations, networks and regimes, even when made up of similar memberships, show different degrees of adaptability and reform in response to the needs and demands posed by rising powers.

The sequence that matches the category with its definition is:

- (A) 1. The established powers
2. Small and marginalized actors
3. Private actors
4. International organizations and other mechanisms of global Governance
- (B) 1. Small and marginalized actors
2. The established powers
3. International organizations and other mechanisms of global Governance
4. Private actors
- (C) 1. International organizations and other mechanisms of global Governance
2. Small and marginalized actors
3. The established powers
4. Private actors
- (D) 1. The established powers
2. Private actors
3. Small and marginalized actors
4. International organizations and other mechanisms of global Governance
- (E) 1. Small and marginalized actors
2. Private actors
3. International organizations and other mechanisms of global Governance
4. The established powers

19

In the definition transcribed in number 1 of question 18, the fragment "Despite their relative decline (...) they still have enough power to act as gatekeepers to the inner sanctums of international regimes." means that

- (A) due to the fact that the Great Powers have been facing political and economic deterioration, they have been imposing the entrance of new international powers to their private club.
- (B) even though the Great Powers have been experiencing adversity, they are still capable of deciding those which will gain access to the select group of international governments.
- (C) given that the Great Powers have been dealing with recession, their power as decision-makers in the international community has been challenged.
- (D) in spite of the Great Powers' adverse political situation, international powers still consider them mighty and inspiring models.
- (E) because the Great Powers cannot detain the access of new regimes to their once highly exclusive group, they have been enduring relative economic recession.

20

In the definition transcribed in number 2 of question 18, the characterization "...countries that represent the proverbial grass that gets trampled when elephants fight." contains

- (A) a metaphor to convey that such countries, mostly in Africa, are known for the wild elephants that wander over their territory.
- (B) an image to reveal that the countries are similar to strong plants that withstand the weight of strong wild animals.
- (C) an analogy to convey the idea that elephants destroy countries that are covered by forest and grass plains.
- (D) a connotative expression that conveys the idea that smaller and less powerful countries are like elephants in that they take time and resist moving away from their original role in international affairs.
- (E) a reference to a proverb used to convey that the big nations have long dominated other countries that are now struggling to find power in the international arena.