



PUC - RIO VESTIBULAR 2009

Outubro/2008

INGLÊS - RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

LEIA ATENTAMENTE AS INSTRUÇÕES ABAIXO.

- 01 - Você recebeu do fiscal o seguinte material:
a) este caderno, com o enunciado das 15 questões objetivas de **INGLÊS - RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS**;
b) um **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA**, com seu nome e número de inscrição, destinado às respostas das questões objetivas formuladas na prova de **INGLÊS - RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS**.
- 02 - Verifique se este material está em ordem, se o seu nome e número de inscrição conferem com os que aparecem no **CARTÃO**. Caso contrário, notifique **IMEDIATAMENTE** ao fiscal.
- 03 - Após a conferência, o candidato deverá assinar no espaço próprio do **CARTÃO**, preferivelmente a caneta esferográfica de tinta na cor preta.
- 04 - No **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA**, a marcação das letras correspondentes às respostas certas deve ser feita preenchendo todo o espaço do círculo, a **lápiz preto nº 2 ou caneta esferográfica de tinta na cor preta**, com um traço contínuo e denso. A LEITORA ÓTICA utilizada na leitura do **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA** é sensível a marcas escuras, portanto, preencha os campos de marcação completamente, sem deixar claros.
- Exemplo: (A) ● (C) (D) (E)
- 05 - Tenha muito cuidado com o **CARTÃO**, para não o **DOBRAR**, **AMASSAR** ou **MANCHAR**. O mesmo **SOMENTE** poderá ser substituído caso esteja danificado em suas margens superiores e/ou inferiores – **BARRA DE RECONHECIMENTO PARA LEITURA ÓTICA**.
- 06 - Para cada uma das questões objetivas são apresentadas 5 alternativas classificadas com as letras (A), (B), (C), (D) e (E); só uma responde adequadamente ao quesito proposto. Você só deve assinalar **UMA RESPOSTA**: a marcação em mais de uma alternativa anula a questão, **MESMO QUE UMA DAS RESPOSTAS ESTEJA CORRETA**.
- 07 - As questões são identificadas pelo número que se situa acima de seu enunciado.
- 08 - **SERÁ ELIMINADO** do Concurso Vestibular o candidato que:
a) se utilizar, durante a realização das provas, de máquinas e/ou relógios de calcular, bem como de rádios gravadores, *headphones*, telefones celulares ou fontes de consulta de qualquer espécie;
b) se ausentar da sala em que se realizam as provas levando consigo o **CADERNO DE QUESTÕES** e/ou o **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA**;
c) não assinar a Lista de Presença e/ou o **CARTÃO**.
- 09 - Reserve os 30 (trinta) minutos finais para marcar seu **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA**. Os **rascunhos** nos Cadernos de Questões **NÃO SERÃO LEVADOS EM CONTA**.
- 10 - Quando terminar, entregue ao fiscal o **CADERNO DE QUESTÕES** e o **CARTÃO-RESPOSTA** E **ASSINE A LISTA DE PRESENÇA**.
- 11 - **O TEMPO DISPONÍVEL PARA ESTA PROVA DE QUESTÕES OBJETIVAS É DE 2 (DUAS) HORAS**.

BOA PROVA!

INGLÊS - RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

A Partnership of Equals

C. Fred Bergsten

To be an economic superpower, a country must be sufficiently large, dynamic, and globally integrated to have a major impact on the world economy. Three political entities currently qualify: the United States, the European Union, and China. Inducing China to become a responsible pillar of the global economic system (as the other two are) will be one of the great challenges of coming decades — particularly since at the moment China seems uninterested in playing such a role.

The United States remains the world's largest national economy, the issuer of its key currency, and in most years the leading source and recipient of foreign investment. The EU now has an even larger economy and even greater trade flows with the outside world, and the euro increasingly competes with the dollar as a global currency. China, the newest member of the club, is smaller than the other two but is growing more quickly and is more deeply integrated into the global economy. Its dramatic expansion is therefore having a powerful effect on the rest of the world. China poses a unique challenge because it is still poor, significantly nonmarketized, and authoritarian. All three characteristics reduce the likelihood that it will easily accept the systemic responsibilities that should ideally accompany superpower status. The integration of China into the existing global economic order will thus be more difficult than was, say, the integration of Japan a generation ago. The United States and the EU would like to co-opt China by integrating it into the regime that they have built and defended over the last several decades. There are increasing signs, however, that China has a different objective. In numerous areas, it is pursuing strategies that conflict with existing norms, rules, and institutional arrangements.

Some take this lightly, viewing it as simply the usual free-riding and skirting of responsibility by a powerful newcomer cleverly exploiting the loopholes and weak enforcement of existing international rules to pursue its perceived national interests. After all, they say, even the United States and the EU do the same on occasion, as do other major emerging-market economies.

Nevertheless, the situation is worrisome. Given its status as a powerful newcomer benefiting from an efficient economic order, China actually has a profound interest in seeing that the international rules and institutions function effectively.

TOWARD AN ASIAN BLOC?

On trade, China has been playing at best a passive and at worst a disruptive role. It makes no effort to hide its current preference for low-quality, politically motivated bilateral and regional trade arrangements rather than economically meaningful (and demanding) multilateral

trade liberalization through the WTO. Since China is the world's largest surplus country and second-largest exporter, this poses two important challenges to the existing global regime.

First, China's refusal to contribute positively to the Doha Round of international trade negotiations has all but ensured the talks' failure. Beijing has declared that it should have no liberalization obligations whatsoever and has invented a new category of WTO membership ("recently acceded members") to justify its recalcitrance. Such a stance by a major trading power is akin to abstention and has practically guaranteed that the Doha negotiations will go nowhere. And since the global trading system does not stay in place, but is always moving either forward or backward, a collapse of the Doha Round would be quite serious.

Second, China's pursuit of bilateral and regional trade agreements with neighboring countries is more about politics than economics. Its "free-trade agreement" with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, covers only a small share of its commerce with the countries in question; it is simply an effort to calm their fears of being swamped by their huge neighbor.

China is also hurting the global trading system by supporting the creation of a loose but potent Asian trading bloc. The network of regional agreements that started with one between China and ASEAN has steadily expanded to include virtually all other possible Asian permutations.

NEW RULES OF THE GAME

What these policies demonstrate is that China's international mindset has not kept pace with its breathtaking economic ascent. China continues to act like a small country with little impact on the global system at large and therefore little responsibility for it. The central thrust of contemporary Chinese foreign policy is not to assume a large role in the world but to avoid international entanglements that could disrupt the country's ability to focus on its huge domestic challenges. Moreover, the speed at which China has risen is difficult for even the most experienced observers to comprehend.

Extracted from BERGSTEN, C. F. A Partnership of Equals. Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2008.

1

The main purpose of the text is to:

- (A) explain China's sudden demographic expansion and its efforts in controlling global trade.
- (B) discuss the political and commercial difficulties China has faced in establishing bilateral agreements with the United States.
- (C) compare China to the United States and Japan in political terms, in order to forecast the future of multilateral trade liberalization.
- (D) look into the factors that explain why it will be a challenge to integrate China into the world's current economic scenario.
- (E) justify why China has not received substantial foreign investment and has refused to participate in the Doha round of international trade negotiations.

2

China's resistance in committing itself to the current global economic system can **mainly** be attributed to the fact that:

- (A) China is extremely large, dynamic and already globally integrated.
- (B) China's unprecedented commercial expansion has been shocking the world.
- (C) a poor and authoritarian nation like China will not learn how to trade with rich nations.
- (D) the European Union and the United States have decided to exclude China from their international trade networks.
- (E) China does not seem interested in becoming an economic superpower if it means adjusting to the current economic order.

3

In Paragraph 3 (lines 20-33), Japan is compared to China since:

- (A) the former was more easily incorporated into the current globalized economy.
- (B) the latter will be considered by future generations an insignificant country, politically speaking.
- (C) both are poor, nonmarketized and authoritarian nations and cannot be characterized as superpowers.
- (D) both have managed to overcome the difficulties in defending the regime built by the US and the EU over the last decades.
- (E) neither has had the chance to accept responsibilities in the new economic institutional arrangements lead by the US and the EU.

4

In C. Fred Bergsten's view, the United States should NOT be characterized as:

- (A) an economic superpower that rejects China's presence in the integrated economy of the global world.
- (B) a strong global economic power, controlling most of the world's foreign investment as a lender and a recipient.
- (C) a leading nation interested in attracting China to the global economic system the US has had a major role in creating.
- (D) a nation of huge dimensions, strong currency, dynamic economic activities and economically articulated in the global network.
- (E) a clever political leader, which will reinforce the current international regulations as long as they fit its national interest.

5

In terms of reference, it is correct to affirm that:

- (A) "such a role" (line 9) refers to "be one of the great challenges of coming decades" (line 7).
- (B) "the other two" (line 16) refers to "the euro" (line 14) and "the dollar" (line 15).
- (C) "a powerful newcomer" (line 35) refers to "China" (line 30).
- (D) "a new category of WTO membership" (line 60) refers to "abstention" (line 62).
- (E) "These policies" (line 81) refers to "Doha round of international negotiations" (lines 56-57)

6

Check the option in which "should" is used in the same sense as in "Beijing has declared that it should have no liberalization obligations whatsoever..." (lines 58-59).

- (A) I can't think why he should have been so angry.
- (B) They demanded that there should be an official inquiry.
- (C) I should think that the journey would be about fifty miles.
- (D) If you should be fired, your health benefits will not be automatically cut off.
- (E) Should you be interested, I have a book on the subject you might like to see.

7

The excerpt "Such a stance by a major trading power is akin to abstention and has practically guaranteed that the Doha negotiations will go nowhere." (lines 61-64) means that:

- (A) the Doha negotiations will fail because China required guarantees that no other country would abstain from voting.
- (B) China's attitude can be understood as a denial to commit itself and has almost doomed the Doha agreement to failure.
- (C) the Doha Development Round aims to certify that major economic nations take a stand against abstention in trade agreements.
- (D) many nations will be absent in the Doha meeting as they have decided to abstain from guaranteeing support to new members.
- (E) China decided not to vote in the Doha agreement because most strong economic trading nations guaranteed that they would not go to the meeting.

8

Check the option that contains a correct correspondence of meaning.

- (A) "likelihood" (line 22) is an antonym for *probability*.
- (B) "disruptive" (line 48) and *disorderly* express contrastive ideas
- (C) "ensured" (line 58) and *guaranteed* have similar meanings.
- (D) "pursuit" (line 68) and *avoidance* are synonymous.
- (E) "thrust" (line 86) could not be replaced by *driving force*.

9

Mark the sentence in which the idea introduced by the word in bold type is correctly described.

- (A) The integration of China into the existing global economic order will **thus** be more difficult than was... (lines 24-26) – *contrast*.
- (B) There are increasing signs, **however**, that China has a different objective. (lines 29-31) – *result*.
- (C) **Nevertheless**, the situation is worrisome. (line 41) – *consequence*.
- (D) **Since** China is the world's largest surplus country and second-largest exporter, this poses two important challenges to the existing global regime. (lines 52-60) – *exemplification*.
- (E) **Moreover**, the speed at which China has risen is difficult for even the most experienced observers to comprehend. (lines 89-91) – *addition*.

10

Check the only option in which the **boldfaced** item refers to “China”.

- (A) “...the issuer of **its** key currency, and in most years the leading source and recipient of foreign investment.” (lines 11-12)
- (B) “All three characteristics reduce the likelihood that **it** will easily accept the systemic responsibilities that should ideally accompany superpower status” (lines 21-24)
- (C) “Some take this lightly, viewing **it** as simply the usual free-riding and skirting of responsibility by a powerful newcomer cleverly exploiting...” (lines 34-36)
- (D) “... **it** is simply an effort to calm their fears of being swamped by their huge neighbor.” (lines 73-74)
- (E) “China continues to act like a small country with little impact on the global system at large and therefore little responsibility for **it.**” (lines 83-85)

11

Check the option in which the phrase in **boldface** is **CORRECTLY** explained.

- (A) ‘usual free-riding and skirting of responsibility’ (lines 34-35) – ‘customary attempt of responsible nations to adopt free trade agreements’
- (B) ‘major emerging-market economies’ (line 39-40) – ‘economies that are majority markets for new products’
- (C) ‘politically motivated bilateral and regional trade arrangements’ (lines 49-50) – ‘political arrangements that are motivated by regional and bilateral commerce’.
- (D) ‘loose but potent Asian trading bloc’ (lines 76-77) – ‘a strong group of Asian nations that maintain fragile commercial ties’
- (E) ‘Breathtaking economic ascent’ (line 83) – an economic growth that is destroying the population

12

The overall tone of the last paragraph of the text is one of:

- (A) anger and shock.
- (B) surprise and irony.
- (C) optimism and hope.
- (D) concern and skepticism.
- (E) indifference and servitude.

13

After reading the passage, one can conclude that:

- (A) China’s fears of being swamped by the neighboring Asian nations lead it to deny membership to the ASEAN block.
- (B) China is eager to belong to the international economic market even before it solves its internal social and economic problems.
- (C) China has strengthened trade with Asian countries and given priority to domestic problems before it assumes a major role in globalized economic institutions.
- (D) the EU and the U.S. have been trying to exclude China from major international organizations due to its obvious preference for regional trade arrangements.
- (E) most world countries have shown an interest in keeping China outside of foreign economic agreements set by organizations such as the WTO or the World Bank.

14

The following excerpt has been extracted from the original version of the article “A Partnership of Equals” by C. Fred Bergsten.

“Such arrangements include parallel Japanese-ASEAN and South Korean-ASEAN deals; various bilateral partnerships, including perhaps a Chinese-Indian one; a “10 + 3” arrangement that brings together the ten ASEAN countries and all three Northeast Asian countries, and possibly even a “10 + 6” agreement that would broaden the group to include Australia, India, and New Zealand. All this activity is likely to produce, within the next decade, an East Asian free-trade area led by China.”

Where in the text does the excerpt fit best?

- (A) **Lines 31-33:** immediately after the sentence “In numerous areas, it is pursuing strategies that conflict with existing norms, rules, and institutional arrangements.”
- (B) **Lines 52-55:** immediately after the sentence “Since China is the world’s largest surplus country...existing global regime.”
- (C) **Lines 68-70:** immediately after the sentence “Second, China’s pursuit of ...more about politics than economics”.
- (D) **Lines 77-79:** immediately after the sentence “The network of regional agreements ... to include virtually all other possible Asian permutations.”
- (E) **Lines 85-89:** immediately after the sentence “The central thrust of contemporary Chinese foreign policy is not to assume a large role in the world ... the country’s ability to focus on its huge domestic challenges.”

15

The following quotes were extracted from articles on the same topic written by other authors. Mark the alternative that contains a quote that **conflicts** with the ideas exposed by C. Fred Bergsten.

(A) "China's gross domestic product (GDP) growth has now outperformed other Asian 'miracle' economies. (...) China grew, on average, 10 percent a year during the past 15 years."

("Why China Won't Slow Down" by Albert Keidel –
Foreign Policy, May/June 2006)

(B) "For all the smart things China has done economically these last three decades, the government's enduring distrust of the workings of the market hurts it in a hundred different ways."

("Why Won't China Trust Mr. Market?" by Joe Nocera –
New York Times, Aug 12, 2008)

(C) "China's extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming East Asia, and future decades will see even greater increases in Chinese power and influence."

("The Rise of China and the Future of the West" by G. John Ikenberry – *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2008)

(D) China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system — especially the declining hegemony — will start to see China as a growing security threat.

("The Rise of China and the Future of the West"
by G. John Ikenberry – *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2008)

(E) "China's daring openness to global commerce has enhanced its economic flexibility and financed new technologies, while judiciously managing key areas such as foreign investment. Japan and Korea never risked opening this fast."

("Why China Won't Slow Down" by Albert Keidel –
Foreign Policy, May/June 2006)